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1. Introduction
The fragmentation of production networks described in the earlier chap-
ters in this book has created a number of challenges for labour unions. 
On the one hand, worker representatives are charged with maintaining 
pay and working conditions for their members in large fi rms or ‘core’ 
workplaces while preventing job losses via externalization (Hassel 
2014). On the other hand, labour unions often seek to organize across 
production networks, with the aim of extending collective agreements to 
workers in peripheral jobs or more poorly organized workplaces (Mac-
Kenzie 2010; Holtgrewe and Doellgast 2012). In this chapter, we argue 
that these two kinds of union objectives are increasingly interconnected. 
As externalization via outsourcing and temporary agency work expands 
and as bargaining coverage declines, unions fi nd it is necessary to im-
prove the standards of externalized jobs to both prevent the erosion of 
pay and conditions for their traditional members and expand union bar-
gaining power (Doellgast et al. 2009; Benassi and Dorigatti 2014).
Our analysis asks under what conditions unions and other worker repre-
sentatives are successful in improving or maintaining conditions across 
production networks, and examines the ongoing challenges they face in 
accomplishing these goals. Findings are based on four case studies of 
incumbent or formerly state-owned telecommunications fi rms in the 
UK, Italy, Sweden and Poland. These cases are drawn from a 10-coun-
try study of restructuring in incumbent telecommunications fi rms in 
1. This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-
061-25-0444]. Some of the material from the case studies in this chapter was taken from 
Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, and Benassi (2015). 
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Europe and the US (Doellgast et al. 2013).2 Competition in national tel-
ecommunications markets over the 1990s was encouraged by the devel-
opment of mobile networks and the internet, as well as by changes in the 
regulation of traditional and emerging market segments. As incumbent 
telecommunications fi rms have faced growing competition in increas-
ingly differentiated markets, they have sought to reduce labour costs and 
increase labour fl exibility. One set of strategies for accomplishing this 
has been to externalize a range of service jobs – including call centre, 
technician and IT services – to subcontractors, service subsidiaries and 
temporary agencies.
In Chapter 5, we focused on one widely used externalization strategy: the 
outsourcing of call centre work. In this chapter, we examine two further 
strategies, with an expanded focus on call centre and technician work-
places. The fi rst is the use of different categories of contingent work, 
including temporary agency and freelance contracts. In some cases, in-
cumbent fi rms outsource jobs to subcontractors, which are then able to 
further depress pay and conditions through using these kinds of contin-
gent contracts. The second involves the transfer of a group of internal 
workers to subsidiaries and subcontractors via spin-offs and outsourc-
ing. This often results in the shift of workers to new individual contracts 
or collective agreements with lower pay and conditions than they for-
merly enjoyed within the incumbent fi rm – or in its core business units. 
Thus, both sets of strategies can be, but are not necessarily, connected to 
outsourcing to a third-party fi rm. 
Similar to Chapter 5, our cases include detail on the effects these strat-
egies have on job quality. However, our focus in this chapter is on 
evaluating the conditions for union success in responding to these dif-
ferent forms of externalization. For this reason, we have chosen cases 
in which unions have succeeded in campaigns to improve or maintain 
pay and conditions in the face of these employer strategies. In the UK 
(BT) and Italy (Telecom Italia), we examine union campaigns to secure 
equal treatment for temporary agency and freelance workers. In Sweden 
(TeliaSonera) and Poland (Orange Polska) we examine union efforts to 
2. This study included incumbent telecommunications fi rms from Austria, Czechia, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden, UK, and USA. Findings are based on over 150 
interviews, as well as site visits, comparative data drawn from collective agreements and 
surveys of union representatives, and archival material. Case study fi ndings focused on 
restructuring in call centre and technician workplaces.
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maintain pay and conditions for workers transferred through a spin-off 
to a service subsidiary or subcontractor. 
We fi nd that in all four cases, worker representatives have had some suc-
cess in improving working conditions or resisting their downgrading, 
based on creative campaigns within core fi rms and across fi rms’ produc-
tion networks. Their strategies have focused on two areas. First, worker 
representatives have used their historic bargaining power within large 
fi rms to negotiate limits on externalization. These strategies have relied 
both on partnerships aimed at improving the productivity of the in-house 
workforce as well as organizing strategies and protests targeted at gen-
erating additional costs to employers associated with negative publicity 
and labour confl ict. Second, worker representatives have sought to extend 
collective representation and legal protections to externalized groups of 
workers. This has occurred via campaigns to organize these workers 
and negotiate agreements with their employers, as well as through cam-
paigns to close ‘loopholes’ in national legislation that allow employers to 
by-pass standard employment protections or equal pay rules. 
Findings suggest that successful campaigns have drawn on heterogene-
ous forms of bargaining power provided by national and sectoral labour 
market and industrial relations institutions. These institutions can be 
strengthened by European directives transposed into national law. In 
some of the cases presented here, directives concerning equal treatment 
for agency workers and transfer of undertaking rules have encouraged 
changes to national legislation. However, these laws are proving to be 
weak without strong union organization in incumbent fi rms and their 
subcontractors, subsidiaries and temporary agencies. Ideally, unions 
need to develop new strategies that mobilize both sets of internal, fi rm-
based and external, institutional resources to succeed in regulating work 
across interconnected core and peripheral workplaces. 
In the following sections, we present fi ndings from the four case studies. 
We then discuss reasons for the differences in union strategy and out-
comes across the cases, and conclude with a refl ection on best practices 
and lessons learned.
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2. UK and Italy: improving the pay and conditions of 
agency workers and freelancers
2.1 UK: BT 
BT – formerly British Telecom – was privatized by the UK government in 
1984, and the market was fully liberalized in 1990. BT negotiates agree-
ments with two unions: the Communication Workers Union (CWU) 
which represents non-managerial grades, and Prospect which organizes 
fi rst-, second- and third-line managers and professionals. While both 
unions’ members are affected by trends of externalization via agency 
work, we concentrate on the CWU as our focus is on the non-managerial 
workforce. 
In the early 1990s, BT began to increase its use of temporary agency 
workers in many areas of work traditionally performed by permanent 
employees. At one point in the late 1990s and early 2000s, around 
10,000 employees were on temporary contracts across the company, 
representing 7% of the workforce. These were concentrated in certain ar-
eas, with a large number in call centres: one interviewee estimated that 
50% of the call centre workforce in BT’s retail business unit were in tem-
porary positions at this time. In the mid-1990s, BT set up telemarketing 
call centres composed entirely of agency workers. 
The terms and conditions for agency workers were poor. Many agency 
workers were paid considerably lower rates than their permanent col-
leagues, despite carrying out similar work. They received no company 
sick pay, no paid maternity leave, only statutory annual leave, and had 
no job security. Agency workers also had a much more fl exible shift pat-
tern, meaning that in some areas they worked more during unsocial 
hours and weekends. Conversions from agency to permanent positions 
were minimal, with some agency workers having worked for more than 
ten years at BT.
The CWU had long criticized the growing use of agency workers as well 
as the poor conditions they were working under. They conducted an in-
ternal debate in 2000:
‘... it was a big internal debate about whether we recruited these peo-
ple or whether we stood up and fought against the strategy of the com-
pany, and I think that it came to a point where we had vociferously 
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tried to oppose the use of agency and it wasn’t getting us anywhere. 
It was becoming so that they were moving so quickly bringing agency 
people in, and some of these agency people wanted to join the union, 
that we had to, I suppose, adopt a two-pronged strategy which was to 
recruit and organize amongst the agency, but to also still deal with BT 
so as to get these people permanent contracts of employment. So we 
were not endorsing the use of agency. We were actually going to the 
company and saying that we wanted these people to be given proper 
contracts.’ (Interview, CWU offi cial, 15/05/2012)
The union mounted a campaign ‘Justice for Agency Workers’ to organ-
ize the agency workers and to work with the temporary agencies to im-
prove conditions. This campaign was successful in increasing member-
ship density among agency workers, which grew to around 50% – a high 
rate for this group of employees. However, this was lower than member-
ship density among the permanent workforce, which was around 90%. 
Recruiting and retaining members proved diffi cult because of the high 
turnover among agency staff. The CWU developed good relations with 
the agencies and was successful in gaining recognition agreements in 
some cases. At the same time, these did not cover pay. 
By the mid-2000s, BT had begun to reduce the number of agency work-
ers across the company. One of the reasons for this was that manage-
ment had begun to recognize that permanent workers provided higher 
quality customer service. Another was related to downsizing in other ar-
eas of the company, and the need to fi nd work for these redeployed em-
ployees. For these reasons, and following union campaigns to decrease 
the share of agency workers, the CWU and BT reached an agreement in 
2006 called the Retail Sourcing Strategy. This allowed for no more than 
10% of the workforce to be composed of contractors, fi xed-term workers 
and agency workers from 2007. In the same agreement, management 
committed to a cap of 2,200 jobs in offshored locations in India. As part 
of this drive, well-performing agency workers in some call centres were 
given BT contracts, although on a new grade that was ‘slightly below’ that 
of the existing workforce. For the individuals concerned, this change im-
plied a salary increase of a few thousand Pounds and employment under 
a permanent contract. By 2013, around 35% of the call centre workforce 
were on these new grades.
Also in the mid-2000s, the CWU started to campaign for legislation 
guaranteeing equal pay and conditions for agency workers in the 
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House of Commons, as well as at EU level where the United Kingdom 
was blocking proposed legislation on this issue. In 2008, the UK gov-
ernment reached a tripartite agreement with employer and worker rep-
resentatives which stipulated that agency workers would be entitled 
to the same pay as colleagues in equivalent permanent positions after 
12 weeks on the job. The government also agreed to the EU Tempo-
rary and Agency Work Directive on equal treatment of agency workers, 
which was passed in 2008 and transposed into national law and imple-
mented in 2011. 
The new regulations ensured that agency workers on traditional agency 
contracts were entitled to terms equal to those of permanent workers 
concerning pay, annual leave entitlement, breaks and the use of facili-
ties. At the time that the legislation was implemented, 4,000 BT agency 
employees qualifi ed for equal treatment; while the CWU had over 3,000 
members (across BT and other companies) who qualifi ed. Union offi cials 
observed that most of these agency employees saw their pay increase, in 
some cases by as much as 20%.
However, the legislation included a clause known as the ‘Swedish Dero-
gation’, which allowed a temporary work agency to be exempted from 
the requirement of equal treatment on pay provisions if it offers an agen-
cy worker a permanent contract of employment and pays the worker be-
tween assignments, or during the periods where they are not working 
and where there are no suitable assignments. Agencies immediately be-
gan to exploit this ‘loophole’ in the legislation. In February 2011, prior 
to the implementation of the agency regulations in October, Manpower 
advised the CWU that they would be trialling ‘pay between assignments’ 
(PBA) contracts for agency employees at BT. By 2013, these had become 
the ‘default contract’ for this group of workers. Union offi cials observed 
that agency workers were required to sign these contracts without be-
ing advised of their implications – particularly that they were ‘contrac-
tually and legally signing away their rights to equal treatment on pay’ 
(Presentation, CWU offi cial, 21/11/2013). As a result, pay gaps began to 
increase again, with agency workers in call centres paid between £2 and 
£4 less per hour than similar permanent workers at the same locations. 
In addition, the proportion of agency workers in the call centres began 
to increase. For example, in 2013, BT employed 3,050 agency workers 
in its UK call centres, compared to around 8,000 permanent employees 
(Interview, CWU offi cial, 17/10/2013).
Union campaigns to organize in the telecommunications industry 
 The outsourcing challenge 183
The CWU initiated a new campaign after the passage of the UK legis-
lation called ‘Closing the Loopholes: Justice for Agency Workers’. This 
campaign had several objectives, including securing amendments to the 
UK Agency Regulations closing this PBA and other loopholes; raising the 
profi le of agency issues among CWU members and encouraging agency 
members to become active in the campaign; raising political awareness 
and support; engaging and working with the TUC and the global union 
UNI; and giving ‘consideration to challenging the UK Agency Regula-
tions within the European Commission’ (Presentation, CWU offi cial, 
21/11/2013). In January 2013, the CWU organized an ‘Agency Action 
Day’, in which agency workers at a number of BT call centres demon-
strated against low pay and inequality of treatment. In September 2013, 
the TUC made a formal complaint to the EC that the UK government had 
failed to properly implement the Directive, citing evidence – provided in 
part by the CWU – that tens of thousands of agency workers were being 
paid less than permanent staff doing the same job. This confl ict was on-
going at the time of writing.
2.2 Italy: Telecom Italia
In Italy, the former state-owned operator Telecom Italia held a monop-
oly in the fi xed-line market until the late 1990s, when legislation liberal-
izing telecommunications was passed in compliance with EU directives. 
The three main unions at both Telecom Italia and in the Italian telecom-
munications sector are: 1) the SLC (Communication Workers’ Union), 
affi liated with the former communist confederation CGIL; 2) FISTEL 
(Union for Press, Entertainment and Telecommunication), affi liated 
with the Catholic confederation CISL; and 3) UILCOM (Italian Labour 
Union for Communications), affi liated with the socialist confederation 
UIL. These unions are joint signatories to both a company agreement 
with Telecom Italia, and a sectoral agreement with the employers’ as-
sociation ASSTEL.
Telecom Italia started outsourcing call centre work during the 1990s. 
One of these subcontractors was Atesia, which became (in)famous be-
cause most of its workers were on freelance, or so-called ‘co.co.pro’, 
contracts. ‘Co.co.pro’, or ‘freelance’ project-based work, was intro-
duced by law (Pacchetto Treu) in 1997 and was regulated by the Biagi 
law up until 2015. The defi nition of a ‘project’ as well as of the degree 
of autonomy is very loose, thereby allowing companies to abuse these 
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contracts.3 When employees are employed under a co.co.pro contract, there 
are no obligations for the employers at the end of the ‘project’ and the so-
cial contributions amount to the half of those for standard work contracts. 
These contracts at Atesia were characterized by low levels of pay – main-
ly based on performance – and social contributions that were lower than 
those set by the sectoral collective agreement. One union representative 
observes:
‘In call centres there is a legal fi ction which allows the company to do 
it [use co.co.pros]. I (as the company) can say that you are formally – 
in reality, you are dependent and come every day for 6 hours in order 
to earn your monthly wage – but formally the call centre can say that 
you are a co.co.pro who organizes her time autonomously and make 
a certain amount of hours available for providing certain services. 
Thus, there is a completely different situation between law and real-
ity, between what really happens and what’s written in the contract 
that should happen.’ (NIDIL/CGIL representative, 14/06/2011)
In the early 2000s, Atesia workers started mobilizing against this prac-
tice. With the support of the unions, they organised a series of demon-
strations and succeeded in getting media coverage. In 2005, in the wake 
of these protests, union representatives and Telecom Italia management 
negotiated an agreement with the aim of improving the precarious em-
ployment conditions of Atesia workers. Telecom Italia purchased 20% 
of Atesia, and then integrated the workers into its subsidiary Telecon-
tact under permanent contracts. The agreement also prescribed the 
transition of around 4,000 freelancer contracts for workers remaining 
at Atesia into standard contracts. Even so, Atesia continued to employ 
many workers on project-based contracts who did not benefi t from the 
telecommunications sector agreement applied to the subcontractor’s 
permanent workers. 
The unions mobilized around the issue of co.co.pros and call centres, 
bringing it to the attention of the public.4 By so doing, they were able 
3. The recent labour market reform – called the ‘Jobs Act’ – re-defi ned more precisely the char-
acteristics of the project-based work in order to reduce the number of co.co.pros by January 
2016. We do not discuss these reforms in detail because the new regulation started applying 
only after the end of our fi eldwork.  
4. See, for example, the demonstrations on 20 October 2007 (RSU Almaviva 2007) and on 19 
September (Vespo 2008).
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to successfully lobby the government. The 2007 Financial Act improved 
the social security of co.co.pros, increasing employers’ pension contribu-
tions and introducing the right to maternity and sick leave. In addition, 
two legal ordinances came into force in 2006 and in 2008, intended to 
limit the use of these contracts – the ‘Circolari Damiano’ or Damiano Or-
dinances. The fi rst ordinance prescribed that inbound call centre agents 
should be offered permanent contracts because the work did not refl ect 
the characteristics of an ‘autonomous project’. When the fi rst Damiano 
ordinance was passed, Atesia asked the confederal unions to bargain 
an agreement stabilizing the employment conditions of only part of the 
co.co.pros instead of all of them, because some call centre agents – such 
as those working at Atesia – were outbound. However, the confederal 
unions refused the compromise. 
The confederal unions pushed then for the second ordinance, which con-
cerned outbound call centre agents, as it was diffi cult to distinguish in 
daily practice between inbound and outbound agents. Sometimes out-
bound agents were even assigned inbound activities so that the company 
could continue using the project-based contracts.5 The second ordi-
nance does not require the stabilization of the employment conditions 
of outbound co.co.pros – as did the fi rst ordinance for inbound call cen-
tre agents – but it requires some evidence of ‘autonomous work’ when 
they are employed on project-based contracts. The Damiano ordinance 
gave call centre and telecommunications companies one year to bargain 
the transition from atypical to permanent contracts with unions, giving 
labour and management suffi cient time to fi gure out the best arrange-
ments with a view to limiting the cost burden on the company as much 
as possible. The outcome was that Atesia stabilised the employment con-
ditions of all co.co.pros (around 6,000). Unfortunately, it started hir-
ing co.co.pros again right afterwards, a practice contested by the unions 
through strikes.6 Although with ongoing contracts, Atesia was forced to 
transition the majority of its workforce onto permanent contracts. This 
created new challenges associated with responding to varying demand 
levels common to the subcontractor sector. However, the unions have 
sought to work with management to fi nd alternative solutions to pro-
vide fl exibility: for example, in October 2012 unions and management 
signed an agreement on short-time work arrangements in order to avoid 
redundancies. 
5. See, e.g. Cobas Almaviva (2008). 
6. See, e.g. Bonaccorsi (2008) and Infoatesia (19.02.2008).
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Parallel to these developments, the unions sought to reduce the use of 
agency work within Telecom Italia’s call centre subsidiary, Telecontact. 
In contrast to the UK, agency work is relatively well regulated in Italy, 
as legislation has been in place since the 1990s guaranteeing temporary 
workers the right to equal pay and equal treatment. The social partners 
also established a special fund for unemployment benefi ts and for train-
ing: when agency workers have a permanent contract with their agency, 
they are entitled to 800€/month and to attend vocational training class-
es while they wait for their next contract. However, equal pay refers to 
the wage levels set in the collective agreements; thus, agency workers do 
not benefi t from company-level agreements, which include social ben-
efi ts and variable pay. 
The collective agreement negotiated with Telecontact at the time it 
was established in 2001 permitted 30 per cent of the workforce to be 
employed on temporary agency contracts. This was much higher than 
in other areas of the company. In 2008, the unions negotiated a new 
agreement to shift 300 of the company’s agency workers onto perma-
nent contracts. By 2012, there were no agency workers in the call centre 
subsidiary.
2.3 Comparison
In both the Italian and UK cases, unions faced similar challenges, associ-
ated with uneven or incomplete application of laws intended to ensure 
equal treatment of different categories of temporary work. The unions 
concerned used a combination of strategies focusing on two areas. First, 
they used lobbying, social partnership and protest to change or enforce 
national legislation extending protections to these contingent workers. 
Second, they sought to mobilize both their traditional members and 
newly organized groups of temporary workers within ‘core’ fi rms to ne-
gotiate limits on temporary employment contracts and improvements in 
conditions for temporary workers. 
These strategies had varied success – and depended on heterogeneous 
forms of bargaining power. In Italy, the unions relied on the mobiliza-
tion potential of their numerous members within Telecom Italia and on 
their political leverage with the government. This was further bolstered 
by public support in the wake of the Atesia ‘scandal,’ which was widely 
covered in the media due to a large extent to union mobilizations. In the 
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UK, the CWU was successful in limiting the numbers of temporary work-
ers and gaining improvements in pay and conditions via application of 
equal pay rules. However, campaigns to close the loophole created by the 
‘Swedish derogation’ are ongoing, and their success will likely depend 
on either support from the European Commission or a change in the 
current government – which has proven unwilling to date to review the 
temporary agency regulations.
3. Sweden and Poland: avoiding declining pay and 
conditions associated with spin-off s and 
subcontracting with employee transfer
3.1 Sweden: TeliaSonera
The largest competitor in the Swedish telecommunications industry is 
TeliaSonera – formed in 2002 through the merger of the former Swed-
ish state-owned monopolist Telia and the former Finnish state-owned 
Sonera. Sweden’s telecommunications market was one of the earliest to 
liberalize in Europe, with far-reaching reforms promoting competition 
coming into force in the mid-1990s. TeliaSonera’s workforce is repre-
sented by two major unions, the blue-collar Swedish Union for Service 
and Communications Employees (SEKO) and the white-collar Unionen, 
as well as by several smaller unions in the academics and professionals 
confederation SACO. These unions were joint signatories to a corporate-
level agreement with TeliaSonera and to a sectoral agreement with the 
employers’ association Almega IT Employers. 
Similar to most incumbent telecommunications fi rms, Telia, and then 
TeliaSonera, established a range of subsidiary companies for different 
business lines, and later spun off a series of business and support ser-
vices. In each case, there was no renegotiation of collective agreements 
or change in terms and conditions of employment: ‘they move all their 
working conditions, salaries, everything, right over to the new company, 
because they use the same collective agreement’ (Interview, SEKO of-
fi cial, 28 May 2012). The most signifi cant ‘events’ involved the establish-
ment and sale of subsidiary companies responsible for internal services 
and for installation and network maintenance activities between 2001 
and 2007 – which affected close to 11,000 employees – most of whom 
were over time transferred to subcontractors. 
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In 2001, Telia formed two separate business units or ‘Groups’ made up 
of business areas that they planned to sell off as ‘non-core’ businesses. 
First, Telia formed the ‘Telefos Group’, made up of 9 formerly internal 
businesses in the ‘business services’ area with 5,600 employees – or 17% 
of Telia employees. The venture capital fi rm Industrikapital purchased 
51% of the Telefos Group in 2001; and each individual company was 
sold between 2001 and 2007. Second, Telia formed the ‘Orbiant Group’, 
made up of six companies with 5,400 employees responsible for network 
maintenance and the installation and servicing of customer equipment. 
Flextronics purchased 91% of the shares in the Orbiant Group in 2001, 
and the remaining 9% in 2002. Then in 2005, Altor purchased a major-
ity stake in Flextronics Network Services, with the two companies merg-
ing under the name ‘Relacom’. 
The creation and sale of subsidiary companies in the Telefos Group and 
Orbiant Group described above was the most signifi cant case of out-
sourcing at Telia/TeliaSonera. As a result of these sales, close to 11,000 
employees were moved to subcontractors between 2001 and 2007. Af-
ter that time, TeliaSonera purchased nearly all of its technician services 
from these subcontractors.
According to a union offi cial, the local trade unions were closely involved 
at all stages of outsourcing, and were able to reach favourable agree-
ments easing staff transfer and retraining:
‘All these persons, they were moving from Telia to the new com-
panies. And they looked after it so everyone would have a job after 
they… when Telia sold it, all the people had these possibilities. But if 
they worked for TeliaSonera and were moved to this new company, 
and they don’t want to move to this new company, they had special 
solutions for them. For instance, early retirement, they had possibili-
ties to be educated. And they also could receive money to go out of 
the Company and have two years…for instance two years of payment.’ 
(Interview, SEKO offi cial, 28/5/2012)
Under Swedish transfer of undertaking rules, pay and basic employ-
ment terms and conditions specifi ed in collective agreements were pro-
tected when employees were moved to the Telia-owned companies, and 
then when the companies were sold to third parties. Thus, the collec-
tive agreements moved with employees – under Swedish law, employees 
continued to be covered by agreements for one year following a transfer 
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of ownership, after which they could be moved onto new agreements 
(but with the same basic pay scale, pension rights, etc.). 
Some aspects of employment conditions and benefi ts changed, despite 
the formal portability of past terms and conditions. According to union 
representatives who had experienced the move from Telia to the subcon-
tractors, pensions gradually became less generous, work content became 
narrower and opportunities for advancement shrunk. However, at the 
same time, there were no direct concessions associated with outsourc-
ing: ‘We are not the same technicians that we were ten years ago. But in 
principle we have the same pay, it is not different in that way’ (Interview, 
SEKO offi cial, 10/5/2012). 
Following the outsourcing of these jobs, there was then further frag-
mentation of ‘production networks’ as subcontractors replaced perma-
nent contracts with temporary contracts. In 2005, the temporary staff-
ing agency Manpower launched ‘Manpower Network Services,’ and the 
subcontractor Relacom downsized its staff – many of whom got jobs at 
Manpower and then were sent back to Relacom as agency employees 
on temporary contracts (Geary et al. 2010). This appears to be a model 
that all of the companies have followed. A union representative from one 
subcontractor estimated that 25-30% of their workforce was employed 
through temporary agencies (Interview, SEKO offi cial, 10/5/2012). An-
other union offi cial interviewed worked for a temporary staffi ng com-
pany through this arrangement, but was posted almost exclusively to her 
former employer: ‘[Subcontractor] let me go, and then I took a job with 
[staffi ng company] who rented me back to the company that sacked me’ 
(Interview, SEKO offi cial, 9/8/2011). 
However, her terms and conditions did not change signifi cantly follow-
ing transfer: her collective agreement with the agency required it to pay 
temporary workers the same salary as colleagues doing similar work with-
in the subcontractor. The union was also able to negotiate a new collec-
tive agreement at this subcontractor in 2010-11 in response to concerns 
with the large number of employees made redundant and then re-hired 
through temporary staffi ng agencies: ‘the new rule is that after a while 
when you’ve been laid off, if the company needs a worker, they need to ask 
you fi rst.’ At other subcontractors, there was an agreement stating that the 
company could not hire temporary agency workers until 9 months had 
passed after layoffs; and within that time period, employees who were 
laid off had to be re-hired if there was a need for additional staff. 
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Temporary employees also had some degree of job and salary security, as 
they were on ‘permanent contracts’ with their temporary agency and re-
ceived 90% of their salary during the time when no work was available in 
their area – again based on a collective agreement. This is equivalent to 
the ‘pay between assignments’ contracts discussed in the UK case study 
above – introduced as part of the ‘Swedish derogation’ in UK law. How-
ever, these contracts were more effective in preserving equal conditions 
in the context of strong collective agreements. In effect, this meant that 
the agency shared some of the risk of business fl uctuations or seasonal 
changes in labour demand with the employee. 
TeliaSonera also outsourced call centre work, though to a smaller ex-
tent. Several interviewees noted that call centres were viewed as a ‘core’ 
area of the business and therefore kept in-house. One union offi cial esti-
mated that around 2,000 call centre employees had been outsourced in 
1998-1999 (Interview, SEKO offi cial, 27/6/2012). However, over time 
the company reduced outsourcing, and by 2014 TeliaSonera had stopped 
subcontracting any of its call centre work in Sweden. In addition, in the 
early 2010s the company was using over a thousand temporary agency 
workers. While these workers were more fl exible, labour costs were simi-
lar to the internal workforce due to high collective bargaining coverage 
and equal pay rules. The union succeeded in convincing management 
to convert most of these employees to permanent contracts as well: ‘we 
said, employ them in-house instead. I think they, the management, de-
cided to do that because they noticed that the quality that they get from 
the employees was bigger if they are employed by us.’ (Unionen repre-
sentative, 27/10/2014)
3.2 Poland
Telekomunikacja Polska was the incumbent telecommunications fi rm 
in Poland. In the early 2000s, France Telecom acquired a controlling 
stake in the company, which is now called ‘Orange Polska’. Around 20 
unions are active at Orange Polska. Two representative industry-level 
unions are the largest: the National Section of Telecommunications 
Workers (SKPT) of the national Solidarity organisation, and the Federa-
tion of Unions for Telecommunications Workers (FZZPT) of the national 
OPZZ. In 1998, the main unions negotiated a multi-establishment agree-
ment at national level, which inter alia covers all direct Orange Polska 
employees. 
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Spin-offs with employee transfer to subcontractors were one of the most 
prominent forms of downsizing at Orange Polska. The EU Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive was transposed into Polish law, stipulating that 
pay and benefi ts under an employee’s former collective agreement must 
remain in place for at least 12 months. However, bargaining coverage 
and union density are lower than, for example, in Sweden. Thus, typi-
cally after the 12-month period, transferred employees would be shifted 
to different – often less favourable – terms and conditions.
At Orange Polska, many spin-offs involved non-core activities. The fi rst 
spin-off in 1997 involved building administration and cleaning services, 
with subsequent ones affecting drivers, couriers, security services, ac-
counting and remote computer maintenance. These services are now 
performed by third-party subcontractors. In many cases, the affected 
former Orange Polska employees transferred to the outsourcing part-
ners. Two spin-offs – of technician services in 2002 (a proper spin-off) 
and of call centres in 2010 (a subsidiary creation) – will be discussed in 
depth to illustrate the process. 
Network services were spun off in 2002, with 6,000 service technicians 
transferred to external companies. As part of this spin-off, the union 
negotiated a programme ‘Work for the worker’: in return for standing 
orders from Orange Polska, these external companies agreed to employ 
former Orange Polska employees on indefi nite contracts and to guaran-
tee them work for 1.5-3 years, depending on the region of Poland. The 
new employment contracts were individually negotiated by workers who 
took a wage cut of 15% on average. However, Orange Polska paid fairly 
generous fi nancial inducements (on average 20 thousand złoty). The de-
cision to move was voluntary, but if technicians decided not to move, 
they would be made redundant. The majority of affected employees took 
the opportunity to leave because the terms offered went far beyond what 
is required by Polish law. 
Some unionists expressed pride in this agreement: ‘The conditions for 
the workers I think we managed to negotiate well, as far as Polish con-
ditions go.’ (Interview with two union offi cials, 07/04/2012). However, 
these measures were only temporary. According to one unionist, ‘After 
the employment guarantees expired, there were further wage cuts and 
redundancies in many companies that took over workers.’ (Email com-
munication with a union offi cial, 11/10/2012). According to another, the 
transitional period ‘was a camoufl age, window-dressing. Because the 
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employer survives these 18 months and then he can do as he pleases, so 
it was only for a while’ (Interview with two union offi cials, 17/04/2012). 
In 2010, the customer service call centres for both mobile and fi xed line 
business units were spun off to the subsidiary Orange Customer Service 
(OCS). Unlike the situation with technician services, OCS remained fully 
owned by Orange Polska. Several waves of tough negotiations were as-
sociated with this spin-off, and the union SKPT led a collective dispute. 
Following this dispute, the unions succeeded in extending the terms of 
the collective agreement for Orange Polska to the new subsidiary. Trans-
ferred employees received a two-year employment guarantee and no re-
duction in their salary. A similar pension scheme was also introduced, 
which constituted a gain for the former mobile business unit employees. 
One unionist described the negotiations: 
‘When the new company [OCS] was founded it did not offer work-
ers anything except for the things that are by law offered to employ-
ees that move to another company, for example, it sets a period of 
employment. … This new company initially did not offer anything. 
Only these negotiations that the unions undertook have led to these 
successes that [union offi cial X] mentioned.’ (Interview, union offi cial 
and works councillor, 15/02/2012)
Orange Polska managers stressed that these provisions went far beyond 
what is required by law: ‘This is important for us, a rather large group 
of people. We would like to carry this out in social peace, we want to be 
fair, we offer this, this and this, and that we will keep’ (Interview with 
four TP managers, 10/07/2012). Union representatives interviewed at-
tributed this success to high membership density and union strength in 
the call centre area. One unionist commented on the difference in union 
strength between technicians and call centre employees:
‘Technicians are a very fragmented group who are not all located in 
the same place. Especially since the network services were spun off in 
2002, there have been fewer technicians who would put up a resist-
ance to the company’s restructuring plans. … Conversely, there was 
defi nitely concern about the call centre employees, because there any 
walkout would be very noticeable for the company, because custom-
ers could not be served completely. It is the customer’s only contact 
with the company. So there was a concern, so perhaps these protests, 
which took place then [when OCS was spun off in 2010] led to the 
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company … fulfi lling all these demands. And it fulfi lled them, all of 
them were fulfi lled.’ (Interview, union offi cial, 19/04/2012)
3.3 Comparison
The Swedish and Polish cases are interesting to compare, because there 
was a similar development in both whereby technician work was out-
sourced, with existing staff transferred to subcontractors, while call cen-
tre work was kept in-house. First, we see different outcomes in the tech-
nician area. At TeliaSonera, subcontracted technicians for the most part 
preserved their pay and conditions over time, even when they were shift-
ed to temporary agencies. This can be largely attributed to encompassing 
collective bargaining institutions, as well as the ability of well-organized 
unions in temporary agencies to negotiate provisions improving job 
and earnings security for their members. At Orange Polska, technicians 
had some protection under transfer of undertakings rules, as well as a 
favourable job security agreement negotiated by the unions. However, 
they experienced wage cuts of 15% associated with being transferred to 
new employers, followed by more signifi cant reductions in pay and con-
ditions after an 18-month transition period. 
Second, we see similar outcomes in the call centre area – but for differ-
ent reasons. At Orange Polska, the union successfully opposed down-
grading of pay and conditions associated with moving call centre work 
to a separate subsidiary, using mobilization of a well-organized mem-
ber base in an area that was strategically important for the company. 
At TeliaSonera, call centre work was shifted in-house and temporary 
agency workers were moved onto permanent contracts in cooperation 
with the union, but also for broader strategic reasons concerning service 
quality. 
A comparison of these cases shows that unions again faced similar chal-
lenges – here associated with maintaining employees’ pay and conditions 
during and after their transfer to different employers or subsidiaries. 
Transfer of undertakings rules in national legislation provided a starting 
point for and some leverage in union negotiations over the terms of em-
ployee transfer. However, similar to the UK and Italian cases, success-
ful union strategies relied on member mobilization ‘across production 
networks’ to use these resources – here across increasingly disintegrated 
networks of subsidiaries, subcontractors, and temporary agencies. In 
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Sweden, more encompassing collective bargaining institutions covering 
these networked workplaces provided a substantially stronger resource 
for unions in maintaining pay and conditions after employee transfer, as 
well as arguing for the re-internalization of call centre jobs.
4. Conclusions
Past research has asked why unions adopt more or less inclusive strate-
gies to organize and represent externalized workplaces or worker groups, 
as well as under what conditions these strategies succeed or fail. Theo-
rists examining trends of labour market dualism have argued that un-
ions in many ‘coordinated market’ or social European countries focus on 
protecting the working conditions of the core workforce, relying on tra-
ditional, institutionalized sources of bargaining power while neglecting 
new groups of service workers or those on contingent contracts (Palier 
and Thelen 2010) – possibly at the long-term expense of working condi-
tions for their own members (Eichhorst 2014). Other researchers argue 
that unions in a range of institutional settings increasingly seek to organ-
ize externalized groups of workers, as their core membership shrinks or 
comes under threat from the expansion of outsourcing to lower wage 
sectors and workplaces (Taylor and Bain 2003; Heery 2004; Gumbrell-
McCormick 2011; Tapia and Turner 2013). However, these studies have 
shown that unions have uneven success in accomplishing these goals, 
despite numerous examples of innovative campaigning, organizing, and 
partnership approaches. 
The case study fi ndings presented in this chapter show that successful 
union strategies to regulate pay and conditions across production net-
works depend on organizing and mobilizing members both within core 
fi rms and across externalized workplaces. Increasingly, maintaining 
job quality for core workers and the bargaining power of their unions 
depends on extending collective bargaining and legislated employment 
protections to peripheral worker groups. In all four cases examined here, 
unions sought to accomplish these dual goals using a range of strategies. 
We argue that variation in outcomes was due not to union enthusiasm or 
reluctance to pursue these strategies, but rather to differences in unions’ 
success in accessing and developing two sets of resources: encompass-
ing labour market institutions and member mobilization across core and 
peripheral workplaces.
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First, encompassing national and sectoral labour market institutions 
were crucial resources for unions in extending terms and conditions 
from ‘core’ to ‘peripheral’ worker groups and employers. In the cases 
examined here, these institutions included national legislation and col-
lective agreements that required equal pay and conditions for temporary 
workers or those transferred to subsidiaries and subcontractors. Among 
the four cases discussed above, Sweden demonstrates the highest cov-
erage of collective bargaining at sectoral level and across externalized 
workplaces. Collective agreements set equal pay for temporary work-
ers and agency workers employed by subcontractors. This broadly pre-
vented TeliaSonera’s strategies of outsourcing, temporary agency work 
and spin-offs from being associated with downgrading of pay and condi-
tions. Unions at subcontractors and temporary agencies were then able 
to build on existing agreements to further strengthen pay and conditions 
through collective bargaining with these external fi rms.
By contrast, national regulation and sectoral bargaining in the other 
three country cases were weaker or characterized by loopholes allow-
ing employers to circumvent encompassing rules. In the Italian and 
UK cases, despite implementation of the EU Directives on equal pay 
for agency and fi xed-term workers, national labour market regulation 
allowed employers to hire certain categories of contingent workers at 
lower pay rates. In Italy, employers used freelance contracts to circum-
vent the equal pay regulation. In the UK, the transposition of the EU 
directive on agency work into national law allowed companies to pay 
lower rates if they offered permanent contracts with pay between assign-
ments. In both cases, unions were involved in campaigns that succeeded 
in strengthening collective bargaining and labour market institutions – 
although in the UK, employers were able to exploit further loopholes to 
again differentiate pay between permanent and temporary workers. 
A second important set of resources unions drew on as they sought to im-
prove pay and conditions across production networks was their capacity 
to mobilize members across core and peripheral workplaces. In the tel-
ecommunications industry, unions are best able to organize strikes and 
campaigns within incumbent fi rms, due to their history of high union 
density and often militant unions. Orange Polska’s union used bargain-
ing power from a well-organized membership base in the call centres 
to oppose plans to differentiate pay and conditions via the creation of 
subsidiaries. Unions also used residual power in the technician area to 
negotiate agreements providing better terms for workers transferring to 
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subcontractors than those required by national law. In both the UK and 
Italy, unions negotiated formal limits on the use of temporary agency 
work within the incumbent telecommunications fi rms. In these two cas-
es, unions also organized temporary agency workers, building up mobi-
lization potential beyond their core workforce. 
Ideally, unions need both sets of resources to challenge management’s 
attempts to differentiate pay and conditions by moving work to more 
poorly regulated sectors and workplaces: encompassing labour market 
institutions and the capacity to mobilize members across increasingly 
heterogeneous production networks. Unions face many challenges as 
they seek to develop and access these resources. We have focused on 
cases in Europe, in which unions enjoy residual institutional bargain-
ing power at national and sectoral level, as well as additional leverage 
to strengthen national laws through the process of transposing EU di-
rectives. In countries or regions with lower union density and weaker 
labour market institutions, these challenges are even greater. We have 
also focused here on the externalization of work to temporary agencies 
or third-party subcontractors located within the same country as the 
core ‘client’ fi rm. The already substantial diffi culties faced by unions in 
regulating work across production networks within these countries is 
signifi cantly exacerbated when work is moved across national borders, 
via offshoring; or handled by subcontractors relying on workers posted 
from other countries. Certainly in the telecommunications industry, 
fi rms are able to offshore or ‘nearshore’ an expanding range of service 
jobs – including, most visibly, call centre work. 
While unions have varying capacity to access the institutional resources 
discussed in this chapter, the case studies have broader lessons for un-
ions as they seek to develop new sources of bargaining power in dis-
tinctive institutional settings. One implication of our fi ndings is that the 
national context remains an important level of action for unions as they 
seek to improve pay and conditions for externalized groups of workers. 
Union campaigns to mobilize across national borders in multinational 
fi rms and their networked subsidiaries, subcontractors, and temporary 
agencies can also benefi t from incorporating different levels of action 
into their strategies. Bargaining power in MNCs, as in incumbent ser-
vice fi rms, depends on success on two fronts: both seeking to close the 
loopholes in national institutions, as well as mobilizing workers across 
organizational boundaries to challenge the segmentation strategies of 
fi rms. 
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